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The Fed’s New Front in the Financial Crisis   
 
The continuing foreclosure crisis worsened in October 2008, though some policy efforts 
appear to be taking hold. Other efforts may complicate the resolution of the crisis, 
however. The Federal Reserve (Fed) continued the aggressive expansion of new credit 
that it began in mid-September. The Fed also created two new credit facilities to add to 
the plethora of other facilities created since the financial crisis component of the 
foreclosure crisis began in August 2007.  These new facilities are aimed at stabilizing the 
commercial paper market, most recently adversely affected by the failure of Lehman 
Brothers and the failures of several money market mutual funds (MMMF) in September 
2008.  
 
Some background on the commercial paper market  
Lehman Brothers was a large issuer of commercial paper, which historically has been 
unsecured short-term borrowing by large companies with exceptional credit ratings. 
Companies that issue commercial paper (CP) are typically firms that have relatively large 
demands for short-term financing.  These firms include non-financial firms as well as 
financial firms, such as the financing arms for auto dealer and buyers including, for 
example, GMAC. These firms seek to avoid the relatively high cost of bank credit, going 
instead straight to the marketplace for short term funds, generally with one to six month 
paper. Here they can trade on their traditionally high credit rating to secure lower cost 
funds very quickly and easily and on an unsecured basis. Since the late-1990s, however, a 
new innovation has allowed firms to access the commercial paper market without the 
credit worthiness and liquidity of the usual issuers by providing CP that is backed, or 
secured, by a claim on a pool of assets. This paper is called asset-backed commercial 
paper (ABCP). It has been important for the development of financing for holdings of 
securitized asset pools, such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS), boosting the market 
for these new securities.   
 
Figure 1 shows the components of commercial paper market since late-2006. The largest 
share of the commercial paper market before August 2007 had been ABCP.  Nonfinancial 
commercial paper has been the smallest component of the market. Commercial paper has 
declined in two major waves over the past 15 months, first from August 2007 to 
December 2007 and then since mid-September 2008.    
 
Commercial paper has played a key roll in the foreclosure-financial crisis in two ways.  
At the beginning of the financial episode in August 2007, many bank holding companies 
attracted attention because they held structured finance assets in special investment 
vehicles (SIVs), composed wholly or largely of MBS, securities with a claim on the 
income from pools of dedicated mortgage assets. These SIVs were financed by ABCP 
issued by the holding companies. After several months of deterioration of the value of 
mortgage assets and MBS, commercial paper purchasers became unwilling to buy new 
ABCP.  This led to a dramatic decline in ABCP in August and September 2007. The 
holding companies adjusted by selling the SIV assets to their affiliated banks, and the 
banks, in turn, financed the new assets by increasing their sales of money market deposit 
accounts and time deposits.    
Figure 1 
Commercial paper outstanding 
Commercial paper outstanding has fallen sharply since July 2007
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Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
 
The second period of sharp decline in commercial paper, beginning in mid-September 
2008, was triggered by the failure of Lehman Brothers on September 14, 2008.  Lehman 
was a large financial CP issuer and their failure raised risk perceptions of all holders and 
purchasers of CP. The decline in demand for commercial paper was reinforced by a 
decline in demand for assets backed by commercial paper. In particular, money market 
mutual fund (MMMF) issuers were historically major purchasers of CP. When CP 
became questionable as an asset class, investors in money market funds ran for the exits 
because their funds were invested, in part, in these CP assets.  As a result, some MMMFs 
failed and the market for commercial paper declined further.  
 
The recent decline is about the same as the earlier one, but unlike the earlier one, it has 
caused a huge reaction by policymakers. In the five weeks following August 8, 2007, 
commercial paper outstanding fell $356.1 billion (16 percent) and in the five weeks since 
September 10, 2008, commercial paper outstanding has fallen $366.2 billion (20 percent). 
Perhaps the different reaction was due to the fact that the latest event was associated with 
a decline in MMMF.  Interestingly, the sharp and quick two-week decline of $200 billion 
in money market funds in September 2008 was concentrated in institutional money funds, 
the type managed by the most astute and informed investors, not the retail investors that 
one might think warrant policymaker protection. Nevertheless, the Fed and Treasury 
reacted very strongly, including the introduction by the Treasury of a government 
insurance program for unlimited balances in money market funds without congressional 
approval, and using funds on which Congress had earlier attempted to place strong 
restrictions after unauthorized Treasury use in the 1995 Mexican peso crisis.  In addition, 
the Fed reacted with new credit facilities described in Tatom (2008a) and below.    
 
There was an earlier shock to public confidence in commercial paper that evoked a Fed 
response out of concern for the stability of the commercial paper market. In June 1970 
the Penn Central railroad was headed for bankruptcy, despite its earlier strong credit 
rating and reputation in credit markets. The Nixon administration had proposed a loan of 
$750 million, including $300 million to keep Penn Central out of bankruptcy, but 
Congress, following the lead of the House Banking Committee chairman Henry 
Gonzalez, was unwilling to make the loan. This would be the equivalent of about $3.5 
billion and $1.4 billion, respectively, today, well below the size of bail-outs involved in 
recent government programs. Because of its inability to obtain a government or other 
loan, Penn Central failed on June 21, 1970, at the time the largest bankruptcy in U.S. 
history. The Fed, fearing repercussions in the CP market because Penn Central’s 
commercial paper had become worthless, tried to boost demand for and the value of 
commercial paper.  To that end, the Fed for some months allowed bank holdings of 
commercial paper to count as bank reserves for the purpose of meeting reserve 
requirements at the Fed. This would not work today because total required reserves, 
largely satisfied already by banks’ holding of vault cash, is trivial compared with the 
volume of commercial paper outstanding.    
 
New Federal Reserve Actions 
In September 2008, the Fed announced the Asset-backed Commercial Paper Money 
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility called AMLF.  This program was aimed at 
lending funds at the primary credit rate to banks and bank holding companies on a non-
recourse basis. The maturities of the loans and of the ABCP cannot exceed 270 days for 
bank holding companies or 120 days for banks.  This program is set to end on January 30, 
2009. 
 
Subsequently the Fed announced the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) on 
October 7, 2008 which creates a Fed financed Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) that would 
buy CP and ABCP directly from issuers. The SPV is run by PIMCO and began work on 
October 27, 2008.  Under the terms of the program, the SPV buys three month assets 
issued at an interest rate equal to the three-month Overnight Indexed Swap Rate (OIS) 
plus 200 basis points, (includes a 100 basis point surcharge for unsecured credit).  For 
ABCP the rate is the three-month OIS plus 300 basis points.  Each issuer participating 
must pay 10 basis points on the maximum potential borrowing under the program in 
order to participate.  This program is set to end on April 30, 2009.  
 
Finally, on October 21, 2009, the Fed announced the Money Market Investor Funding 
Facility (MMIF) which creates another SPV managed by JP Morgan Chase that will buy 
CDs, bank notes and highly-rated commercial paper with 90 days to maturity or less from 
50 approved MMMFs. The SPV will pay with ABCP issued by the SPV equal to 10 
percent of the purchase price; the other 90 percent of the purchase price will be paid from 
funds advanced by the Fed to the SPV. The assets acquired will be held to maturity and 
the proceeds will be used to pay the Fed and to redeem the ABCP issued by the SPV.  
The rate on the Fed loans will be the primary credit rate and the SPV will pay each holder 
of the new ABCP issued 25 basis points less than the rate on the assets acquired. Assets 
are purchased by the SPV at amortized cost.   
 
On Monday October 27, 2008, the Treasury began to use the $700 billion allocated by 
Congress on October 3, 2008 for the Temporary Asset Relief Program (TARP). The 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 authorized $250 billion for immediate 
use, $100 billion to be released on the approval of the president and a final $350 billion 
available subsequently with the approval of Congress. Originally intended to purchase 
illiquid mortgage-related securities, the first $250 billion will be used to purchase stock in 
the nation’s banks. The first $125 billion was spent on the first day, October 27, 2008, to 
acquire non-voting stock in the largest nine U.S. banks.   
 
The explosion in Federal Reserve credit has continued 
Table 1 shows selected Fed balance sheet items on a weekly average basis for the weeks 
indicated, except for total assets which are for the last day of the period shown.  All of the 
new programs for private sector credit are indicated, as well as what was previously the 
largest Fed asset, Government securities held outright, and government securities held 
under repurchase agreements. The new AMLF and CPFF are shown, but the latter only 
existed for the final three days in the period. It reached about $145 billion by the end of 
the period, however. The other new facility discussed above, the MMIF, is not shown 
because it had not begun as of October 29, 2008. The penultimate row, a Fed liability 
called supplementary financing, captures Treasury borrowing from the Fed, the proceeds 
of which are held on deposit at the Fed. These Treasury securities are then sold by the 
Fed in order to raise funds to be lent to the private sector. This new program was 
announced on September 17, 2008. This convoluted operation is done to keep Fed 
lending to the private sector from increasing bank reserves by more than they otherwise 
would, putting more downward pressure on the federal funds rate.   
 
One pattern that is emerging is the federal government’s depression-era practice of 
creating multiple new agencies and programs known by an alphabet soup of acronyms.  
In the Fed’s case, all of this new credit could have been provided by open market 
purchases of U.S. government securities. But the Fed has chosen instead to target credit 
to specific private financial firms and groups of firms. Until recently, the Fed had chosen 
to finance the new credit by reducing credit provided to the federal government. This is 
indicated by the small change in total assets from August 2007 to August 2008. Since 
August 2008, the Fed has more than doubled its total assets, largely by expanding its 
private sector lending.  Meanwhile it has sharply reduced its net lending to the federal 
government, the liquidity of its balance sheet and the government securities available 
should it wish to sell securities for monetary policy purposes.   
 
Generally these efforts have spawned new demands for subsidized credit to the private 
sector apparently with little reduction in the illiquidity of private sector assets.  See 
Thornton (2008). Moreover, each new emergency program of the Fed or Treasury has 
been followed by an equity market decline, suggesting that these actions are lowering the 
expected return to capital and/or raising risk premiums that investors require to be 
compensated for heightened risk.  Since mid-September, another disturbing development 
is that investors have pushed up the real rate of interest required on default risk-free 
assets, the yield on Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) securities. Apparently 
investors are coming to recognize the crowding out of productive investment and the 
reduced private capital stock that are implied by recent policy actions. Figure 2 shows the 
yield on 10-year TIPS securities rose to the highest level since 2003, 2.99 percent in the 
week ending October 17, 2008 from about 1.63 percent in September and the record low 
of 0.99 percent in the week ending March 14, 2008.  A greater and quieter reliance on 
less risky and more effective traditional programs in future might induce less of a decline 
in expectations and increase in uncertainty, fear and panic in financial markets. 
   
Figure 2 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, U.S. Financial Data, October 24, 2008.  
 
 
Perhaps the most significant question to emerge over the past two months is not whether 
these actions will stem the financial crisis, but whether the government and the Fed have 
an exit strategy to pull all of this new financial asset creation out after it succeeds in 
stemming deflation and before it kick starts the economy into a major inflation problem.  
For example, the Fed successfully injected a huge amount of credit and liquidity into the 
economy in late 1999 in anticipation of the Y2K millennial change and as quickly pulled 
it out at the beginning of 2000, after it was clear that there were no disruptions to the 
economy. It may not be so easy this time.     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Fed asset growth: from nothing to an explosion 
(millions of dollars)  
Selected Assets 
(average for week 
ending on date 
indicated) 
 
October 29, 2008 
 
August 6, 2008 
 
August 1, 2007 
Securities held 
outright 
 
 $490,382 
 
$479,291 
 
$790,758 
Repurchase 
agreements 
 
   80,000 
 
 110,500 
 
 25,786 
Term auction credit 
(TAF) 
 
  
  301,363 
 
  
 150,000 
 
 
NA 
Primary credit   111,946 17,370               2 
Primary dealer 
Credit facility 
(PDCF) 
 
 
 87,393 
 
 
0 
 
 
NA 
Asset backed CP 
MMMF liquidity 
facility (AMLF) 
 
 
  99,902 
 
 
NA 
 
 
NA 
Other credit 
extensions 
 
  89,549 
 
0 
 
NA 
Commercial Paper 
Funding facility 
CPFF*  
 
 
  40,819 
 
 
NA 
 
 
NA 
Maiden Lane**    26,809 29,105 NA 
Securities lent to 
dealers 
  -term (TSLF) 
 -overnight facility 
 
 
   222,566 
  25,067 
 
 
124,862 
 7997 
 
 
NA 
  9,917 
Total private credit 
-Incl. security loans 
          837,781 
         1,085,414 
        306,975 
        439,834 
25,788 
35,705 
Total assets 
(end of period) 
 
         1,931,261 
 
 901,307 
 
874,112 
Supplementary 
Financing 
Account*** 
 
 
 558,864 
 
 
NA 
 
 
NA 
Available 
Government 
Securities 
 
 
 242,749 
 
 
346,432 
 
 
780,841 
* Portfolio value of the SIV created to hold and transact commercial paper acquired under 
this facility; equity position.  
**Maiden Lane is counted as a credit even though it is an equity position.   
** *Fed liability for Treasury Supplementary Financing Account created in the week ending 
September 24, 2008 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
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